




THE GAME OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
PIONEERS, IMITATORS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Leonardo Becchetti, Giorgio Federico, Nazaria Solferino 
 
Working Paper n. 15 
Maggio 2005 
 
in collaborazione con 
 
 
 Leonardo Becchetti 
Università di Roma, Tor Vergata 
 
Giorgio Federico  
Università di Roma, Tor Vergata 
 
Nazaria Solforino 
Università di Roma, Tor Vergata 
 
Informazioni : 
Facoltà di Economia di Forlì  - Corso di Laurea in Economia delle Imprese Cooperative e delle ONP 
Tel. 0543-374620 – Fax 0543-374618  e-mail: nonprofit@spfo.unibo.it   website: www.ecofo.unibo.it 











Università Tor Vergata, Roma, Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di 
Economia e Istituzioni, Via di Tor Vergata snc, 00133 Roma. E-
Mail : Becchetti@economia.uniroma2.it  
 
Giorgio Federico  
Università Tor Vergata, Roma, Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di 
Economia e Istituzioni, Via di Tor Vergata snc, 00133 Roma.  
 
Nazaria Solferino 
Università Tor Vergata, Roma, Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di 




In this paper we outline a model of horizontal product 
differentiation where two duopolists  – a profit maximising 
producer (PMP) and a “socially responsible” “fair trader” (FT) 
producer – compete over prices and (costly) “socially and 
environmentally responsible” features of their products. We 
analyse the optimal PMP reaction in price and location on the 
“social responsibility segment” under the assumption that 
                                                 
1 The paper and the research on FT has greatly benefited from 
comments and suggestions in different seminars held at SOAS in 
London and at the Universities of Catania, Copenhagen, Macerata, 
Milano Bicocca and Verona. We thank F. Adriani, S. Anderson, M. 
Bagella, L. Bruni, R. Cellini, F. Cowell, L. Debenedictis, L. 
Lambertini,  F. Perali, G. Piga, J.B. Rosser, P. Scaramozzino, R. 
Sugden, C. Whilborg, L. Zarri and S. Zamagni. The usual disclaimer 
applies.    3
consumers have quadratic costs in buying a product which is below 
their own ethical standard. 
We show that, when consumers’ perceived costs of ethical distance 
are high enough, PMP’s partial ethical imitation is part of his 
optimal reaction under different theoretical frameworks. 
We finally evaluate deviations of PMP and FT price-location 
choices from social optimum, finding that – even though FT’s 
entry represents a Pareto improvement for consumers in the North 
– strategic complementarity between prices and ethical location 
leads to prices and location which are above domestic (but not 
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Why companies such as Vodafone suddendly announce that they will 
distribute “socially responsible (fair trade)
2 coffee” from their 
office vending machines all over the world ? 
What pushes large transnationals such as Kraft, Nestlè or 
Starbucks to introduce new lines of socially responsible (fair 
trade) products ? Why they voluntarily reduce their profit margins 
on these products to increase their social and environmental 
sustainability by paying more to subcontractors or commodity 
producers and introducing higher environmental standards ?
 3  
                                                 
2 The definition of fair trade product considered in this paper 
(for additional details see what follows in the introduction), is 
quite different from the traditional meaning of “Fair trade” in 
the field of industrial organization. From the 1930s onward 
(although there are antecedents going back to 1900), in both the 
US and the UK, the term refers to schemes of industry trade 
association to regulate competition among members, usually by 
requiring that prices be posted in advance and that no 
transactions take place except at posted prices.  During the Great 
Depression in the U.S., such schemes were part of the National 
Recovery Act. In the more recent literature fair trade indicates 
"arguments that relate to certain conditions under which trade, 
and the production of traded goods, should minimally take place” 
(Maseland - Vaal, 2002). In this framework fair trade generally 
refers to the absence of duties, controls and dumping practices in 
international trade. For a similar use of the term see also 
Mendoza - Bahadur, 2002; Bhagwati, 1996; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Suranovic, 2002).The fair trade products we refer to in this paper 
are on the contrary food and artisan products which obtain the 
fair trade label since their production process follow some 
criteria for social and environmental sustainability established 
by the movement of fair trade importer and retailers. 
3 One of the world's biggest players in the coffee market, the US 
consumer good company Procter & Gamble, announced it would begin 
offering Fair Trade certified coffee through one of its specialty 
brands. Following Procter & Gamble's decision to start selling a 
Fair Trade coffee, also Kraft Foods, another coffee giant, 
committed itself to purchasing sustainably grown coffee. 
Furthermore, Kraft will buy 5m pounds of Rainforest Alliance 
certified coffee in the first year, according to an agreement 
between Kraft Foods and the Rainforest Alliance (EFTA Advocacy 
Newsletter  n° 9). In Italy, the Fair Trade certification brand 
TransFair Italy certifies specific fair trade products sold by   5
The aim of this paper is to provide a rationale for these 
“anomalies” which apparently contradict the profit maximizing 
goals of corporations, unless we explicitly take into account and 
model social responsibility as a new competitive dimension. 
Our story starts from the observation that the compression of 
distances led by innovations in the fields of electronics and 
telecommunication
4 has increased consumers perception of the   
interdependence among countries and made more urgent to solve 
problems related to the “markets failures” and the insufficient 
provision of global public goods. 
On our opinion this is the framework in which competition for 
social responsibility (SR) is born. The process may be divided in 
two stages. In the first, the growing sensitiveness of the public 
opinion toward social responsibility,
5 generates a series of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
consumers good distribution companies and multinationals such as 
Coop, Carrefour, Sma, Pam, Gs, Conad 
(http://www.macfrut.com/ita/conv_2003/relazioni/162benvenuti_f2.pd
f). 
4 Some interesting (non strictly economic) definitions of these 
phenomena or globalisation are “death of distance” (Cairncross, 
1997), “intensification of social relationships linking distant 
places in the world so that what happens locally is affected by 
what happens  thousands of kilometers away” Giddens (2000), 
“intensification of the conscience of the world as a whole” 
(Robertson, 1992). It is also well known that the process of 
global integration is not new, was intense at the beginning of the 
20th century, experienced a sudden inversion between the two world 
wars and had a sudden acceleration in the last thirty years 
(Debenedictis-Helg, 2002). 
5 The increased sensitivity is revealed by the growth of socially 
responsible consumption. In a recent survey the “2003 Corporate 
social responsibility monitor” (downloadable at 
http://www.bsdglobal.com/issues/sr.asp) finds that the amount of 
consumers looking at social responsibility in their choices jumped 
from 36 percent in 1999 to 62 percent in 2001 in Europe. In 
February 2004, a research undertaken by the market research 
company TNS Emnid in Germany on a representative sample of the 
population finds that 2.9% of those interviewed buy Fair Trade 
products regularly, 19% rarely, and 6% almost never.   35% of 
respondents said they support the idea, but do not buy   
(www.fairtrade.net/sites/aboutflo/aboutflo). In a parallel UK 
survey, Bird and Hughes (1997) classify consumers as ethical (23 
percent), semi-ethical (56 percent) and selfish (17 percent). 18   6
"bottom-up" welfare initiatives, usually classified under the 
general definition of (zero profit) socially responsible (or 
socially concerned) saving and consumption. This phenomenon gives 
rise to a first generation of pioneers selling SR products. These 
pioneers conquer positive market  shares and make traditional 
producers aware of the existence of consumers choosing not only on 
the ground of price, quality and “ads induced” status symbols, but 
also on the basis of the social or environmental values 
incorporated in the products. In a second step, pioneers’ entry 
triggers traditional producers’ competitive reaction, based not 
only on prices, but also on partial imitation in the field of 
social responsibility.  
To illustrate this process the paper focuses on a special group of 
socially responsible products: the so called fair trade products.  
Fair trade is a product chain created by zero profit
6 importers, 
distributors and retailers of food and textile products which have 
been partially or wholly manufactured by poor rural communities in 
developing countries under specific social and environmental 
criteria. To obtain the “fair trade”  label products need to 
comply with a series of criteria, defined by the Fair Trade 
Labeling Organisation (FLO)
7: i) paying a fair wage in the local 
context; ii) offering employees opportunities for advancement 
                                                                                                                                                                  
percent of the surveyed consumers declares to be willing to pay a 
premium for SR products. For a survey on the theoretical 
literature on social preferences see (Fehr-Falk, 2002).  
6 Fair trade associations usually have zero or negligible economic 
profits. This condition is often statutory since most of them take 
the form of cooperatives. For simplicity we assume here that they 
are zero profit. The assumption of small positive profits would 
not change the substance of our model based on the assumption that 
profit maximisation is not the goal of FT importers. In the year 
2001 97 importers and 2741 specialised retailers followed these 
rules and were part of the FT movement in the EU. In 2000, in the 
U.S. and Canada, 600 outlets wholesaled Fair Trade products, while 
at least 2575 offered retail. In 2001, at least 7000 provided 
retail. 
7 Further information on Fair Trade may be found, among others, on 
the following websites www.eftafairtrade.org (European Fair Trade 
Association) and www.fairtradefederation.com  (Fair Trade 
Federation).   7
(including investment in local public goods); iii) providing equal 
employment opportunities for all people, particularly the most 
disadvantaged; iv) engaging in environmentally sustainable 
practices; v) being open to public accountability; vi) building 
long-term trade relationships; vii) providing healthy and safe 
working conditions within the local context; viii) providing 
technical and financial assistance (price stabilization insurance 
services and anticipated financing arrangements which reduce 
financial constraints) to producers whenever possible. 
Most of these criteria may be seen as bottom-up solutions to 
specific market failures and  have been shown to be preferable in 
terms of welfare effects to the purchase of a good on the 
traditional market coupled with a charity donation (Becchetti-
Solferino, 2003).
8 The fair wage/price criterion states that, in 
the price paid to producers in the South, a much higher share of 
the value of the product must be transferred to them than what is 
usually the case. If we assume, as it often is, that raw or 
intermediate material producers in the South have very low 
                                                 
8 Intuitively, there are at least five reasons for such 
superiority: i) only the fair trade purchase generates the 
positive indirect effects on social responsibility of traditional 
producers under the conditions explained in this paper; ii) fair 
trade channels provide learning through export, price 
stabilization services and promote inclusion of unskilled but 
potentially productive workers (producers) in international labour 
(product) markets; iii) charity does not necessarily reward more 
productive people; iv)  fair trade, differently from charity, 
provides a minimum wage measure needed to solve market failures in 
case of monopsonistic labour markets (or may reduce intermediary 
rents in local transportation market); v) fair trade contributes 
with anticipated financing to reduce uncollateralised producers’ 
credit constraints together with their dependence from 
monopolistic local moneylenders; vi) the FT bottom-up mechanism 
may be more efficient than government subsidies in targeting the 
poor; vii) joining consumption and social transfer reduces 
transaction costs of aid to the poor with respect to the 
traditional tax financed government aid scheme. More specifically, 
points iv) and v) show how FT improves market competitiveness (in 
credit and labour markets) while charity does not. Finally, when 
FT consumer price is not substantially higher than the traditional 
product price, the FT choice results to be much cheaper than the 
traditional purchase plus charity donation alternative.    8
bargaining power and are in a quasi-monopsonistic market,
9 the fair 
trade price can be related to the market price which would prevail 
if the two counterparts would have equal bargaining power. In this 
respect, it may become a non governmental minimum wage provided by 
private citizens in developed countries.  
Adriani and Becchetti (2005) also show that using prices as a 
policy instrument to transfer resources to the South cannot be 
considered a market distortion but a market creation since fair 
traders open in the North a new market in which “contingent 
                                                 
9 Support for the existence of monopsonistic labour markets for 
unskilled workers, not just in LDCs but also in developed 
countries, is provided by several authors (Manning, 2003; Card and 
Krueger, 2000). Manning (2003) argues that labour markets may be 
thin not just in presence of a single employer, but also when 
employers are few and collude or   in the presence of geographical 
distance and labour differentiation. Evidence of employers’ excess 
market power in LDCs countries is provided by Terrell and El 
Hamidi (2001) finding that minimum wages reduce inequality and 
increase employment on a large sample of workers in Costa Rica and 
by several paper investigating the effects of minimum wage 
policies in Brazil (Camargo, 1984; Gonzaga et al., 1999; Carneiro, 
2002; Lemos, 2004). Furthermore, we argue that, by just looking at 
published empirical papers, evidence of monopsonistic labour 
markets is underestimated  because of a selection bias. The more 
the labour market is informal and characterized by exploitation, 
the more difficult it is that it can be object of a systematic 
empirical analysis. To quote evidence from reliable reports not 
object of systematic empirical research, the US state department 
signals that in 2003 there were about 109 000 children working in 
dangerous conditions in Ivory Coast, the source of 4 percent of 
the world's cocoa. Starbucks financed an independent study of 
working conditions in the Guatemala coffee sector in 2002. The 
study was undertaken by the Commission for the Verification of 
Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) and released in February 2000, 
reporting extensive violation of labor law in the areas of wages, 
health care, and hours. COVERCO conducted another report on living 
and working conditions on Guatemalan coffee plantations in March 
2003. However, it should be emphasized that the labour market 
story is just an example of a more widespread phenomenon. We could 
think of alternative examples in which self-employed farmers sell 
their crops to a single exporter. For instance, Conley and Udry 
(2003), in describing the functioning of the pineapple production 
in Ghana, report that farmers plant and grow their crops, while an 
exporter is usually in charge of harvesting and shipping the 
fruits to Europe.    9
ethical” products (combining physical products and values) are 
sold. 
Fair trade products are beginning to achieve non negligible 
market shares.
10 They captured around 2% of the ground coffee 
market in the EU and about 15% of the banana market in Switzerland 
in the year 2000
11. 
Within the above described framework the model outlined in 
this paper aims to analyse structure and consequences of the 
“social responsibility game”. The paper is divided into six 
sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the second 
section we shortly describe the basic features of the model, a 
horizontal differentiation duopoly,  in which physical distance is 
reinterpreted as “social responsibility” distance.  
In the third section we analyse the sequential entry version of 
the model in which a profit maximising incumbent reacts to the 
entry of a socially responsible player. We analyse equilibria 
under the two different cases of incumbent fixed ethical location 
and incumbent joint reaction in prices and ethical location, 
outlining conditions under which the latter decides to partially 
imitate the entrant. In the fourth section we describe solutions 
of a simultaneous game in prices and ethical location played by a 
profit maximising and a zero profit socially responsible player. 
In the fifth section we compare equilibria of the previously 
mentioned versions of the model with the socially optimal price 
and locations fixed by a social planner which maximises welfare of 
consumers with heterogeneous preferences on social responsibility. 
 
                                                 
10 There is a growing interest on Fair Trade also in the 
institutions. In the 1999 the European Commission issued a 
document about Fair Trade (29.11.1999 COM(1999) 619; in its 
introduction is underlined the potential goods effects of Fair 
Trade to reduce inequalities between the richest and poorest 
countries and in promoting a sustanible development. Two years 
later, in the 2001, the European Commission issued also a  “Green 
Book” COM(2001) 366 to promote firms’ social responsibility in a 
european framework, and  a relevant part of this book just deals 
with the Fair Trade experience.  
11 The source is the EFTA Yearbook 2001.   10
 
2. The basic assumptions of the model before FT entry 
 
Most of the hypotheses in the model which follows are standard 
assumptions in the horizontal differentiation literature. Some of 
them are original and are given by the specific nature of ethical 
competition. We outline model features by defining producers, 
market space and consumers. 
 
The production side  
The monopolist profit maximiser 
The monopolist transforms raw materials received from unskilled 
producers in the South paid with a monopsony wage (w). He 
maximizes profits by fixing a price PA for his product which is 
sold to consumers in the North. 
 
The Fair Trader  
We assume in this benchmark model that there are no “free lunches” 
in ethical responsibility and we abstract from asymmetric 
information on the quality of FT product. The Fair trader's 
criteria of action are those described in the introduction. We 
"stylise" these features by assuming that the entrant sells his 
product at zero profit and transfers an exogenously fixed “free 
margin”  s
 12 (after paying the monopsony wage) which is needed to 
comply with all the Fair Trade criteria (provision of local public 
goods, premium on the monopsony wage, creation of a long term 
                                                 
12 We take the fair trader as an example of socially responsible 
producer and identify social responsibility in the resources 
transferred to producers in the South. Our model may be 
generalised and applied also to "environmentally concerned" 
producers by assuming that the adoption of environmentally 
responsible production processes increases costs exactly as in our 
fair trader's example.   11
partnership through the provision of export services, etc.).
13 The 
zero profit condition of the entrant is therefore: PB =w(1+ s). 
 
The market space 
The entry of the FT into the market has the effect of creating a 
new market space along an "ethical" segment which we assume to 
have unit length for simplicity and without lack of generality 
(Figure 1). Location on the left extreme corresponds to the choice 
of no transfer to South producers (s=0) in addition to the 
monopsony wage, while location on the right extreme corresponds to 
the choice of a transfer exogenously fixed when the Fair Trade 
criteria mentioned in the introduction are fully complied (s=s=1). 
Within these two extreme choices we observe that both producers 
dispose of a set of strategies in social responsibility - as  
where a∈[0,1] - allowing them to locate in any point of the 
segment if they want. 
 
                                                 
13 Fair Trade criteria of action imply a series of initiatives in 
support of  producers in the South (prefinancing, provision of 
local public goods, a premium as a minimum wage measure against 
monopsonistic labour markets, export services, price stabilisation 
mechanisms, training and counselling etc.). On the premise that 
these initiatives are not costless, we stylise all of them in the 
model into an additional cost component (the transfer s) that the 
FT send to the producer in the South. Hence, the transfer s is not 
related to the minimum wage only and the reason of its existence 
does not disappear, even in case of end of the monopsony on the 
labour markets. 
Second, the FT dimension with respect to world markets and the 
multiple directions of its action make that the decision of a 
single FT to trasnfer s does not reduce its need in the future for 
further producers. A very effective and concentrated action in one 
area may reduce the monopsony problem, but it does not eliminate 
the other reasons of the transfer.  Hence, it is not unreasonable 
to consider that the individual FT decision to send s does not 
eliminate the aggregate problem of the inclusion of small 
uncollateralized producers with low bargaining power in the South. 
These considerations  led us to focus on the interaction between 
FT and incumbent without modelling the effects of the s transfer 
in the South.   12
The demand side  
Consumers   
Consumers have inelastic, unit demands and heterogeneous 
preferences on social responsibility. Therefore they are uniformly 
distributed across the line segment [0,1] (a standard feature in 
horizontal differentiation models).
14  
A different position in the interval for consumers does not imply 
differences in physical distance or in product characteristics, 
but in the psychological perception of the ethical value of the 
good.
15 The consideration of ethical instead of physical distance 
makes a difference in at least two ways. First, consistently with 
our concept of ethical distance, the cost of moving along the line 
segment is positive only for those going from a more ethical to a 
less ethical point. As a consequence, by considering the extreme 
right of the segment as the most ethical position, consumers move 
without costs to the right, while they incur in costs proportional 
to the “ethical” distance anytime they move to the left. 
16 This 
explains why costs are increasing in the distance between 
consumers and PMP location for consumers buying from the PMP in 
Figure 1. 
We assume that consumers utilities are decreasing in product price 
and also in the distance between consumer's ethical stance and the 
                                                 
14 Import duties, value added taxes and transportation costs are 
obviously part of total costs of importers of agricultural 
products from the South. In this paper, though, they do not affect 
our results and therefore are omitted from the model for 
simplicity.  
15 In this model we abstract from considerations of asymmetric 
information and divergences between consumers' and sellers' 
perception of the ethical value of the good by assuming that they 
coincide. To reduce distance from reality it may be interesting, 
in an extension of this model, to analyse market equilibria under 
asymmetric information and considering the role of ethical 
labelling. 
16 The rationale for these assumptions is that moving to the left 
implies choosing a product below one’s own ethical standards 
(which is psychologically costly), while moving to the right 
implies choosing a product above one’s own ethical standards 
(which may be even considered "too much" and therefore we assume 
it does not give any psychological cost to the buyer).    13
ethical value incorporated in the purchased product. The 
psychological cost of buying a product which is below one's own 
ethical standards is t times the ethical distance so that 
consumer's welfare is 
Wc=Rp-Pi-t(x-a)
2 if x-a≥0
17 or Wc=Rp-Pi if x-a<0  
where (Pi) is the price of product sold by the i-th seller, (Rp) 
is the common consumers’ reservation price and x denotes generic 
consumer location. 
After the specification of the FT’s behaviour and of consumer’s 
position on the segment the cost of ethical distance has a clear 
monetary counterpart. When the producer is located at the right of 
the consumer this cost represents the distance in monetary terms 
between the transfer, which is considered fair by the consumer 
(indicated by his location on the segment) and the transfer 
provided by the producer (indicated by producer’s location on the 
segment). The coefficient t maps this objective measure into 
consumers preferences. 
 
The ethical features of the model 
Given the model characteristics it is clear that the SR  feature 
coincides with the application of the set of specific FT criteria 
along the value chain. These criteria promote a series of actions 
to foster inclusion of South producers with low bargaining power 
in international markets. Hence, SR is related to what happens in 
the productive process and in the overall value chain behind the 
product more than to the intrinsic features of the product sold.  
 
                                                 
17 The way we design consumers preferences is consistent with 
empirical evidence and consumers surveys in which values are shown 
to be a determinant of choices together with prices (see footnote 
5). From a theoretical point of view this point has been 
remarkably analysed, among others, by Sen (1993) showing that 
people choose also on the basis of their values and, for this 
reason, they do not always choose what they would strictly prefer 
on the basis of prices. Lexicographic preferences are ruled out 
here but may be considered a limit case of our model when costs of 
ethical distance go to infinity.     14
 
3.1 The effects of the entry of the socially responsible producer 
when PMP’s location is fixed  
 
In this section we assume that the profit maximising producer is a 
monopolistic incumbent set at the extreme of the ethical segment 
(he chooses the strategy a=0).
18 An "orthodox" Fair Trader fully 
complies with exogenous FT criteria, enters the market and places 
himself at s =1.
19 The PMP ethical location is fixed and its 
reaction can be only in prices. 
As explained in section 2 the zero profit condition of the entrant 
is: PB =w(1+s). 
After the FT’s entry the consumer’s indifference condition is 
equal to PA+t(x-a)
2=PB, if x-a≥0, and PA=PB, if x-a<0. Hence, the 
condition for a nonzero market share for the FT is, for some x, 
t(x-a)







= * . This implies that the incumbent market share 
increases (decreases) less than proportionally in the price gap 
(in the costs of ethical distance (t) perceived by consumers). 
It is possible to show in this first simple example  that the 
incumbent finds it optimal to reduce his price after the fair 
trader entry when his location is fixed. after the fair trader 
entry the incumbent maximises  
                                                 
18 The assumption will be removed in section 4 of the paper. It is 
reasonable if we assume that the PMP is initially uninformed about 
consumers ethical preferences (or he has to pay a sunk cost higher 
than future expected benefits from being more ethical to verify 
whether these consumers exist) and FT entry with its market share 
reveals the existence of these consumers to him. 
19 The case of FTs with non endogenous location in the SR segment 
is consistent with their international criteria which fix, in the 
market of agricultural commodities such as coffee, cocoa, etc. a 
standard contingent premium on market prices adopted by all local 
organisations. In cocoa and coffee markets for the last 20 years 
the premium reached a maximum of twice the market price in market 
downturns, and a minimum of 5% in market upturns (EFTA 2003 Fair 
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The incumbent price is, as expected, increasing in the fair trader 
transfer to the South. His optimal price is between his zero 
profit price and the zero profit fair trader price. This means 
that the incumbent divides the distance between these two prices 
in two parts. One of them (the largest) is his margin and the 
other (the smallest) is the extent of the price cut. The last  is 
due to the new element of competition introduced by the FT’s 
entry. In this first simple case the incumbent cannot react on 
location. He therefore uses prices to compete with the entrant and 
to defend his market share. 
Conditions for the existence of a duopoly reconsidered given 
optimal PMP reaction 
Consider that, with quadratic costs of ethical distance, PMP 








≥  for t≤sw/3. Hence, with FT 
exogenous location (s=s=1) and t<1/3 conditions for FT entry do 
not materialise and the PMP maintains all the market.
20  
 
3.2 Joint price and ethical location choice of the incumbent. 
 
In this section we remove the hypothesis of PMP fixed location and 
analyse how the incumbent reacts to the FT’s entry, by choosing 
both optimal price and location along the SR segment. 
Given the absence of asymmetric information in the model, there 
are no “free lunches” in social responsibility. Hence, in order to 
move right in the ethical location, the incumbent must transfer a 
positive sum to producers in the South in the same way as the fair   16
trader does. Since a∈[0,1] we argue that (as) is the total 
incumbent transfer, where (s) is the fair trader transfer and (a) 
the incumbent’s location choice. This parametric choice ensures 
that, if the incumbent chooses an ethical location identical to 
that of the fair trader (a =1), he transfers exactly the same 
amount to the South.  
This hypothesis makes ethical location and prices two non 
independent variables. This difference adds to the two already 
mentioned differences between ethical and traditional horizontal 
differentiation: i) distance costs apply only in one direction 
(movements to the right in the ethical segment) and ii) one of the 
duopolists (the fair trader) does not maximize profits. Results 
from the joint maximization problem of the PMP lead us to 
formulate the following proposition 
Proposition 1. If the PMP jointly chooses price and ethical 
location after the socially responsible entry, the model switches 
from an equilibrium with maximum ethical differentiation with no 
imitation to an equilibrium with partial ethical imitation when 
consumers marginal costs of ethical distance are higher enough 
than producer costs of ethical imitation 
 
Proof. In his simultaneous price-location choice the incumbent 
maximizes: 









=−+ +  
 
  (3) under the nonnegative location 
constraint a≥0.
21 Solving the first order conditions we obtain the 
following solutions for the optimal incumbent’s price
22  
                                                                                                                                                                  
20 With w conveniently normalised to 1 this implies t>1/3 for FT 
existence and t>3/4 for PMP imitation.  
21 Consider also that: i) to rule out positive values generated by 
the product of negative margins and negative market shares we only 
look at solutions with positive mark-up constraint and that ii) 
the PMP price cannot be higher than the FT price for real and 
positive values of PMP's market shares. 
22 The apparently counterintuitive result of the positive 














=−  (5) for t>(3sw/4), while, 
when t<(3sw/4), a*=0 and PA* is that calculated in (2) as optimal 
price in the problem with exogenous PMP location. Hence t=3sw/4 is 
the threshold of consumers costs of ethical distance which 
triggers PMP imitation. ■ 
 
Note that higher consumers sensitiveness toward ethical 
responsibility raises gains from ethical imitation and therefore 
leads to higher PMP optimal price and imitation in equilibrium. 
Furthermore, both optimal price and location are increasing in 
consumers costs of ethical distance while the effect of FT 
location on PMP optimal price is ambiguous. On the one side, more 
ethical FT location raises PB allowing the PMP to compete with 
higher prices. On the other side, it raises costs of ethical 
imitation, thereby reducing one source of PMP price increase.  
 
 
4.1The simultaneous game with the “altruistic” FT 
 
The first rudimentary model of section 3 starts from the realistic 
assumption that Fair traders only recently appeared on product 
markets and incumbent profit maximisers reacted to their entry. In 
this section we investigate the interaction between profit 
maximisers and fair traders (and conditions for PMP imitation) 
into the broader context of simultaneous games by demonstrating 
the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: the simultaneous game, in which the FT chooses 
location so to maximize transfers of both producers and the PMP 
chooses price and location, yields partial PMP imitation, with FT 
located in an interior point of the unit ethical space.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
distance depends on the positive relationship between optimal PMP 
price and ethical imitation which is evident from the PMP price   18
 
Proof: In the simultaneous game the PMP and the FT jointly 
maximise, respectively, profits and total transfers to the South 
(i.e. the sum of the amount transferred to Southern producers both 
from PMP and from FT),  under s*≤1.  
The three FOCs are  
0
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where (6) and (7) solve the PMP and (8) the FT maximisation 
problem formulated as  * *] 1 [ asx x s T Max
s + − = . 


























* − =  (11). By replacing these 
reaction functions into the third equation of the system, we get, 
after some manipulations: 
w
tw t w t w
s
2
16 ) 4 3 ( ) 4 3 (
*
2 + + + + −
=  (12) which is 
lower than one and therefore within the unit SR segment. 
23 By some 
algebraic transformations it is possible to show that, under (12), 
the condition t>3sw/4, under which ethical imitation is convenient 
for the PMP, is always respected. 
Therefore  the FT chooses his location in an internal point s* 
inside the unit segment and, given that t>3s*w/4  always holds, a* 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reaction function (PA*(a*)) derived from first order conditions. 
23 By normalizing w=1 with no loss of generality, we obtain a range 
of s*∈[.11,.76] given the reasonable range of t∈[.1,3] for 
consumers’ costs of ethicaldistance. More generally, with w=1, 
lim * 1
t s
→∞ = . 
   19
and PA*, obtained by replacing s* in (10) and (11), correspond to 
the PMP’s optimal price and location in the simultaneous game.■ 
 
An important feature of this solution is that total transfers are 
increasing in PMP ethical imitation. Since total transfers are the 
goal of the FT he will find convenient to elicit PMP imitation 
and, for this reason, he will find it optimal to locate himself 
more to the left in order to reduce PMP's costs of imitation.  
 
4.2The simultaneous game with the “selfish” FT 
 
 Notice that this last result may change if  the FT, is less 
“altruistic” and chooses the best location by maximising his own 
transfers and not total market transfers. In such case we may 
observe a trade-off between radicalism and effectiveness of social 
responsibility evidenced by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. The fair trader optimal position on the SR segment 
in the simultaneous game with the PMP is more “socially 
responsible” when he maximizes his own and not total market 
transfers to the South. In this case, and under given parametric 
conditions, such position may reduce the likelihood of PMP 
imitation and total SR transfers to the South. 
 
Proof: the new maximand of the “selfish” FT is   *] 1 [ x s T Max
s − = .In 
that case the third equation of the system (6-8) of FOCs becomes 



















T A B A B   (8’) and, by replacing PMP price 
and location reaction functions (respectively 10 and 11) into it, 
































 (13) which is always 
positive. This implies that the FT will choose the highest s 
compatible with the constraint s≤1. Therefore his optimal location 
may be only at the right extreme of the SR unit segment (s=1).   20
At the same time,  for t>3/4, (10) and (11) still express the 
optimal PMP’s price and location choices. 
On the contrary, if t<3/4, PMP chooses a=0 as in the fixed 



























   (14). As a consequence, we fall in the 
case in which t=3sw/4 so that a=0 is still the optimal PMP 
location choice. Since s* (the optimal location of the 
“altruistic” FT) is lower than s=1 we may fall into cases in which 
3s*w/4<t<3w/4 and therefore the PMP would imitate with altruistic 
but not with selfish FT. Hence the “selfish attitude of the FT 
reduces the likelihood of PMP imitation and total transfers to the 
South under relevant parameter ranges.
24 ■  
 
The difference between FT locations when he maximises total 
transfers or his own transfers clearly identifies a trade-off 
between radicalism and effectiveness of social responsibility. If 
the FT goal is to maximise his own transfers he will be more 
radical in social responsibility, while, if the goal is to 
maximise total transfers to the South, he will be more pragmatic 




5.Social planner  
 
We are now interested in comparing results from the previous 
versions of the model with socially optimal prices and locations 
of the two players. Consider a social planner that maximises 
consumers welfare by fixing a zero profit price - Pi=w(1+si) -  for 
both players. Under this condition he chooses PMP and FT locations   21
(respectively a and b) which maximise social welfare on the 








By remembering that, in the ethical segment, only consumers moving 
from the right to the left have costs of ethical distance, the 
social planner problem is to find optimal locations a and b 
maximising consumers welfare  
MaxWc= [] [] [] [] ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
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 (15) 
or, equivalently, minimising consumers total costs (TC): 
[] [] [] [] ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫

















A dx b x t P dx P dx a x t P dx P MinTC    (16) 
To solve this problem consider that when, for simplicity, we set 
w=1, the indifference condition yields  
b a x t a P a x t P B A + = − + + ⇒ = − + 1 ) ( 1 ) (
2 2
       (17) 
implying the following market share for the player located more to 






= *            (18) 
By replacing (18) in (16) we get: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
24 More precisely, by normalizing w=1 we find that total market 
transfers to the South are higher in the simultaneous game with 
altruistic FT when t ∈[.3,.8] 
25 We conventionally continue to consider a and b, respectively as 
the PMP and the FT location even though, for the social planner 
fixing for both a zero profit rule, the distinction between the 
two vanishes.    22
23
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The solution is analytically cumbersome and it may be easier to 
solve it by considering optimal location under reasonable 
parameters ranges.  
We start by considering that x*∈[0,1], normalizing w=1 and 
evaluating a and b for different values of consumers costs of 
ethical distance (t). Results of optimal prices and locations in 
different games compared with social optimum are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4. 
 
The most important conclusions that can be drawn are the 
following. 
First, for low levels of t the FT always chooses a location within 
the unit segment and therefore inferior to its exogenous location 
(difference between Ex(a) and SIMI(a)) given that, to maximize 
transfers to the South, it is optimal to be less socially 
responsible in order to capture a higher market share.  
Second, PMP imitation starts at the lowest levels of consumers 
sensitivity to ethical distance in the simultaneous game in which 
the FT is altruistic (maximizes total market transfers) (the 
difference between SIM(a) and SIMs(a) is always positive for any 
level of t in Figure 2). The joint (price-location) choice of the 
PMP with exogenous FT location is an intermediate case (for any 
level of t SIM(a)>Ex(a)>SIMs(a)), while the lowest and latest PMP 
reaction in ethical location  (SIMs(a)) is in the simultaneous 
game in which the FT maximizes his own transfers.  
Third, PMP growth in ethical location is less than proportional in 
the increment of consumers costs of ethical distance, consistently 
with the limited capacity of conquering additional market shares   23
in a model in which consumers sensitivity is quadratic and not 
linear.  
Fourth, PMP and FT location tend to diverge in the simultaneous 
game in which the FT is altruistic, while they tend to converge in 
all other cases since the FT rapidly moves to the extreme of the 
segment, while the PMP increases imitation in proportion to 
consumers perceived costs of ethical distance (Figure 2). 
Fifth, consistently with proposition 3 we observe that the 
altruistic FT is less radical than the FT which maximizes his own 
transfers (the difference between SIMs(b) and SIM(b) is positive 
for any t) since, by being more radical, he can trigger more 
imitation and imitation is in his own target when he maximizes 
total market transfers. Hence, in our model radicalism is 
therefore a consequence of “non altruism", or of maximizing one’s 
own transfers and not total market transfers. 
Sixth,  social planner optimal locations are always lower than 
privately optimal locations (SP(a) is below SIM(a), SIMs(a) and 
Ex(a) and SP(b) is below SIM(b), SIMs(b) and Ex(b) for any level 
of t). This is because social planner is not concerned with market 
shares and therefore he does not use ethical location for 
strategic concerns. On other terms, strategic complementarity 
between prices and ethical location is such that higher prices, 
justified by more ethical location, may help and not prevent the 
conquest of additional market shares. The private equilibrium 
therefore leads to excess ethical location and excess prices with 






In recent times we assisted to an outsurge of (costly) initiatives 
in the field of social responsibility of large transnational 
companies with a behaviour which is in apparent contradiction with 
the conventionally assumed profit maximising strategy.     24
In this paper we explain why this contradiction does not exist 
when such behaviour is correctly interpreted as the optimal 
reaction to the entry of a zero profit socially responsible 
producer which conquers market shares by selling to consumers with 
stronger preferences for social responsibility. 
Our results show that, under reasonable parametric conditions, the 
optimal reaction of the monopolist incumbent PMP to the entry of 
socially responsible producers is ethical imitation. The extent of 
ethical imitation depends on its cost, on consumers sensitiveness 
to social responsibility and on the structure (simultaneous, 
sequential) of the social responsibility game. 
In the final section of the paper we compare privately  optimal 
prices and locations of the two players with those of a social 
planner maximising welfare of consumers in the North. Our results 
show, somewhat surprisingly, that all equilibria in the game 
exhibit too much social responsibility from a domestic welfare 
perspective. Such result is crucially affected by our assumption 
of a duopolistic market and by the complementarity between prices 
and ethical location. 
In evaluating this result we must not forget though that the FT 
represents by itself a Pareto improvement for consumers in the 
South, since it is equivalent to the creation of a new market of 
contingent goods in which new products, combining physical and 
socially responsible characteristics, are sold (Adriani-Becchetti, 
2005). Furthermore, the result of excess social responsibility 
might be reversed if we incorporate preferences of South producers 
to the social planner problem. In that case we might obtain an 
interesting result of an oligopolistic market equilibrium which 
attains the international socially optimal level of social 
responsibility. We would have therefore an (oligopolistic) market 
mechanism based on the strategic complementarity between prices 
and social responsibility which compensates with entirely private 
and voluntary mechanisms the absence of an international social 
planner.  
   25
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Figure 1. The ethical product differentiation and the asymmetric 



























Legend: moving to the left of the ethical segment implies choosing 
a product below one’s own ethical standards (and therefore is 
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one’s own ethical standards (and therefore does not give any added 
psychological benefit or cost to the buyer). F
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